Abstract: Okasha (2006) proposed distinguishing aspects of selection: those based in particle level traits (MSL1), and those based in group level traits (MSL2). It is proposed here that MSL1 can usefully be further split into two aspects, one (MLS1 E ) representing selection of particles based in their individual interaction with environmental properties, and one (MLS1 G ) representing Multi Level Selection of particles based in their relation to group properties. Similarly MSL2 can be split into two parts based in this distinction. This splitting enables a characterisation of how emergent group properties can affect particle selection, and thus affect group traits that are important for survival. This proposal is illustrated by considering a key aspect of animal and human life, namely the formation of social groups, which greatly enhances survival prospects. The biological mechanism that underlies such group formation is the existence of innate primary emotional systems studied by Panksepp (1998), effective through the ascending systems in the brain that diffuse neurotransmitters such as dopamine and norepinephrine through the cortex. Evolutionary emergence of such brain mechanisms, and hence the emergence of social groups, can only result from multi-level selection characterised by the combination of MSL2 and MLS1 G . The distinctions proposed here should be useful in other contexts.
level: MLS2 E is the group level selection effect due to aggregation of individual advantage characterised by MLS1 E .In contrast to this, MLS2 G is group level selection that occurs specifically because of the existence of the group as an emergent entity, resulting in properties at the individual level being selected for by MLS1 G . The combination of MLS2 G and MLS1 G is a form of selection of individuals that is essentially multilevel in character.
In order to make the case that this proposal of distinguishing MLS1 G and MLS1 E can work and is useful, it is necessary to give an example where this distinction can be convincingly made. That is the topic of Section 2, discussing group formation in all higher animals (including humans). It is then necessary to show there is some payoff from this proposal. Okasha discusses how a linear regression model is often better than Price's Equation when investigating multilevel selection. Section 3 considers how the proposal made here will be reflected in a modified version of that linear regression model, making the multi-level relations clearer. Section 4 presents an underlying biological mechanism (innate emotional systems) which plausibly explains animal group formation as discussed in Section 2. This mechanism is realised through specific aspects of the brain, namely the `ascending systems' linking nuclei in the limbic system to the cortex. It is suggested that existence of this biological mechanism and the associated brain structures can only be explained by multilevel selection, as considered in the preceding sections. Finally Section 5 briefly considers how this proposal fits into the bigger picture of evolutionary theory.
2: EVOLUTION AND THE ISSUE OF GROUP FORMATION
This section considers the core issue of group formation in all higher animals. To make the situation specific, consider the case of why animals, say buffalo in the Kruger National Park, or people, say Bushmen in the Kalahari, find it important to group together in herds or tribes. The key point is that a collection of buffalo wandering around on their own is not a herd; it is an aggregation (the whole is just the sum of its parts). If the same buffalo band together as a herd interacting in a social way, they can collectively protect each other, sensing danger earlier than when alone and acting together to protect each other, and so are far more likely to survive. A specific example: a herd can act together as a unit with the common purpose of warding off danger of attack by lions.
1 The same is true for a group of Bushmen: living isolated lives on their own, they are vulnerable to many dangers and will find it difficult to get food. If they band together, on the other hand, they can act collectively to protect young, detect dangers, ward off predators, and hunt together, and can share food, skills, resources, and information. The whole is much more than the sum of its parts; the young are much more likely to survive. A similar example is social learning in primate foraging decisions (de Waal, 1 For a graphic demonstration of the protection provided in this context by the common purpose of a collective of buffalo, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xHIkUzRw2jw.
Borgeaud, and White 2013). It is crucial that culture and technology can evolve in this context. A specific example: the skills of animal tracking (Liebenberg 2001) 2 are passed down from generation to generation through a group educational process. This collective process, impossible unless the group acts as a collective, greatly enhances the survival prospects of the group. Banding together into social groups probably played a key role in the evolution of language and intelligence (Donald 1991 , Pringle 2013 , which enabled human domination over all other species.
The selection dynamic in action is shown in diagram 1.
Environment
Environmental aspects:
fitness-1E Particle Examples are individuals being able to run very fast, being very strong, and so on. Selection for such traits is thus the case of selection based on individual traits alone, and can operate in an unstructured population in which there are no groups at all, but it will also operate when groups exist. This trait confers individual fitness-1 E in regard to the overall environment, and is selected for by MLS1 E .
It is not multi-level selection as regards the individuals, in that it is just selection based on properties of the individual. However aggregation of the individual Trait1E over all the members of the group improves group survival capacity, and so underlies the group level Trait1 (the group is more likely to survive if it is made of stronger and faster members). Even though this is "nothing but" the sum of the parts, it enhances group survival. This leads to multilevel selection MLS2 E at the group level, in that this aspect of the group's fitness is due to aggregation of the enhanced fitness of its members.
Trait2 is a group trait that gives a selective advantage to the group as a whole because the group is an emergent entity, acting as a collective. In the case of the buffalo, examples are the herd moving together to seek water in places remembered by older animals, forming a defensive ring against predators, and so on. These obviously can't be a trait of the individuals (one buffalo is not a herd, which by will definition require at least 5 members; less than that is a group, which confers lesser advantage). They confer fitness-2 due to group existence in the overall environment (which includes lions in the surroundings), and are selected for by MLS2 G . In the case of the bushmen, traits leading to advanced survival prospects include the use of language to communicate with each other, and group hunting of giraffe. These are of course not possible if the group does not exist.
At the individual level, Trait1 G is an individual trait that gives an advantage relative to the environment because of the existence of the group; it is a capacity underlying way the individual takes advantage of the existence of the group, which could not occur if the group did not exist. Thus cooperative individuals who are willing to learn will benefit more through the group's existence.
Those who ignore group wisdom are likely to perish soon.
The key group level trait underlying all these possibilities is the mere fact of group existence: the tendency to live together as a cooperative group, emergent from the individuals that comprise it. It is the buffalo being together as a herd that allows crucial secondary traits to develop. The same is true a fortiori for the bushmen, who through the existence of the group develop far greater survival capacity, particularly through development of technology and tactics that is taught to children.
The key individual level trait underlying the individual benefit accruing from the group, is the individual having a propensity to join a group. They then can benefit by learning from the group, getting its protection, and so on. It is because of this sociable propensity at the individual level that the group emerges from the individuals that comprise it: this is the glue that holds the group together. This confers individual fitness fitness-1 G in regard to the environment because of the existence and nature of the group, and is selected for by MLS1 G . Individuals who do not have this propensity to join a group (they like to keep away from the group and go off on their own, are uncooperative and unwilling to learn, and so on) are not so likely to survive, because they do not focus on below (Section 4). It has played a key role in the evolution of humanity.
3: LINEAR REGRESSION EQUATIONS
Linear regression models consider a collective-level trait as part of the context relevant to each particle within that collective, according to the equation (Okasha 2006: 87,198; Pigliucci 2010 ):
where w is the particle's fitness, z is the particle-level trait, Z is the collective-level trait, β 1 , β 2 are regression coefficients, and e is the error term.
According to the present view, one can refine this relation in a number of ways. Define z 1E as the particle-level trait solely due to individual fitness, and z 1G as the particle-level trait for individual Figure 1 ); there will be no effect if either of these terms vanishes. It is this non-linearity that underlies the crucial importance of group effects. This non-linearity is because MLS2 G combined with MLS1 G gives a route
whereby the environment constrains the particle properties in virtue of the combination of selection criteria fitness-2 G and fitness-1 G ; they then act up to the emergent level to give the required traits Trait 2 at the group level in virtue of the lower level traits Trait1 G . The way this happens depends on whether we are concerned with evolutionary (diachronic), developmental, or functional (synchronic) mechanisms and timescales.
The set of equations (2)- (5) obviously allow a more detailed analysis of multilevel effects than does the original equation (1). It is a pragmatic issue as to which of the selection effects represented in (5) by β 1E and β 12G is more important in a specific context.
4: THE UNDERLYING BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
The key issue I now address is the behavioural and biological mechanisms at the individual level that underlies formation and stability of social groups, thereby leading to the group selection advantages fitness-2 discussed in section 2.
Behavioural systems: There are two basic behavioural needs relating the group level to the individual level in order to ensure group formation and stabilisation.
1. Group formation: Firstly, in order that meaningful social groups exist, cooperative behaviour between the units that make up the group is crucial: "cooperation amongst lower level units is central to the emergence of new higher levels, because only cooperation can trade fitness from lower to higher levels" (Michod 1999 ). There are all sorts of mechanisms at the group level intended to make this happen (roles, uniforms, teaching, myths, and so on): "each element making up a social system serves a function that assures the maintenance of the system" (Longres 1990: 39). But that is not enough: in the case of animals and humans, the individual must be responsive to them: they must want to belong to the group. There needs to be an internal mechanism to produce this response.
2.Group stabilisation:
Generically whenever individuals cooperate together to form groups, there must be mechanisms for regulation of conflict (Okasha 2006: 205) , requiring adaptations that suppress within-group competition in order that the group emerge as a genuine whole with adaptations of its own (Okasha 2006: 221-222, 227-228) . Again there will be group level mechanisms and processes with this purpose (sanctions, teaching, a legal system, and so on), but by themselves they will not suffice: there must be internal mechanisms to help produce this outcome.
How are these realised at the individual level? In the case of all mammals (including humans), there are plausible biological mechanisms at the individual level underlying both the formation and conflict regulation of such emergent groups. Social groups form because of innate tendencies of individuals to form such groups. The source for this tendency lies in innate primordial emotional systems shared by humans and all higher animals (Panksepp 1998) , which are our evolutionary heritage, given to us to help guide decisions we make (Ellis and Toronchuk 2005) and thereby shape intellect (Damasio 1995 (Damasio , 1999 . These innate emotional systems function through giving us feelings that tend to produce specific kinds of actions that have promoted survival in our evolutionary ancestors, both human and mammalian (Panksepp and Biven 2012) .
In particular there are two such systems that have evolved to create and protect emergent social groups as discussed above. These are (Toronchuk and Ellis 2013 (Stevens and Price 2000:47-48; Price, 1967) . This generates a dominance hierarchy which is a social ranking system (the pecking order, the alpha male, etc.); conflict takes place to attain one place in this system, but then acceptance of one's place, and associated territorial rights, regularizes resource allocation in a largely peaceful manner.
These two systems dominate much of social life, and provide the emotional power that enables groups to function. As stated by Stephens and Price (2000:50) , "In short, the evidence points to the existence of two great archetypal systems: that concerned with attachment, affiliation, care-giving, care-receiving, and altruism; and that concerned with rank, status, discipline, law and order, territory and possessions. These may well be the basic archetypal patterns on which social adjustment and maladjustment, psychiatric health and sickness depend."
These primary emotional systems have evolved over evolutionary times precisely in order to ensure that social groups will come into existence and then be stable (there can be no other reason for their existence as genetically determined systems). We know that they are selected for, because they are innate, and are shared with our ancestral relatives, human and animal (Panksepp and Biven 2012) .
Thus they are key examples of individual level traits z1 G that have been selected for via individual selection MLS1 G , in order to promote group benefits Z 1G , as indicated by equation (2).
These systems enable the group to come into being, and would not exist as innate systems if there was no major benefit provided by existence of social groups. They have been genetically determined because they are crucial to survival. Putting these together with the kinds of group level traits Z 1G discussed in Section 2, the implication is that in equation (5), z 1G Z 1G ≠ 0 in both cases.
Brain Structure: As in all biology, structure and function are closely linked (Campbell and Reece, 2008) . The behavioural mechanisms suggested here must be based in genetically determined underlying neural systems in order to be plausible. This is indeed so: the brain mechanism underlying these behavioural tendencies is the diffusely projecting `ascending systems' of neurons linking nuclei in the limbic system to the neocortex (Kingsley 1996: 132-133) , together with the associated neurotransmitters. These systems 3 spread small-molecule neurotransmitters and monoamines such as norepinephrine and dopamine, known to be facilitators of emotions, through the cortex, and hence shape our affective reactions to the world around us (Panksepp 2001 (Panksepp , 2012 which are crucial to brain function (Damasio 1995 (Damasio , 1999 . They form the `value system' identified by Edelman (1989 Edelman ( , 1992 and Edelman and Tononi (2001) as guiding the brain plasticity made possible by neuronal group selection. This is a crucial mechanism for brain plasticity, allowing innate primary emotions to shape adaptation to the physical and social environment in the light of our ongoing experience (Ellis and Toronchuk 2005) .
There has to be an evolutionary explanation for the existence of these ascending systems in the brain, which are quite different than the local connections characterising the neural columns that dominate the cortex (Hawkins and Blakeslee 2005) . The need for evolution of the innate emotional systems -a key influence in evolutionary history -is the obvious answer. And the need for some of these systems was driven by the evolutionary advantage of group formation, as discussed above.
However not all of these affective systems are of this group-based character. A proposed set of such primary emotional systems is shown in Table 1 . This is a summary of the proposals of Toronchuk and Ellis (2013) , adapted from those of Panksepp (1998 Panksepp ( , 2013 by inclusion also of a disgust system (Toronchuk and Ellis 2007) and the ranking system. This proposal is split into two sets: those characterised as fulfilling individual needs (E0-E5), and those fulfilling social needs (E6-E9). The obvious implication is, A case where this may be contentious is Play (E5), which has been classified as an individual trait, even though it plays a considerable role in inter-individual interactions. The view taken here is that the ultimate source of play is indeed in the individual mind, as it explores reality and tries out different options in a creative way -an essential part of the learning process. Group play is derivative from this individual tendency, rather than the other way round.
This proposal accounts for existence both of these behavioural characteristics, and the neural systems (Kingsley 1996: 132-133 ) that lead to their existence. It has an essentially multi-level nature. If one does not agree with this specific proposal for innate emotional systems, the same issue of the nature of evolutionary origins of the mechanism will arise for any other competing proposal for innate emotional systems (e.g. proposals that there is only one valenced affective system).
THE BIG PICTURE
This paper has used the specific example of existence of social groups to support the usefulness of the distinction between MLS1 G and MLS1 E (Section 2). Such a distinction is needed to give an evolutionary explanation both for the existence of the emotional systems that are crucial to intellectual functioning (Damasio 1995 (Damasio , 1999 , and also for the ascending systems and associated nuclei in the brain that are the neural bases for these emotional systems (Scarr et al 2013) . Together with the case of meiotic drive quoted by Okasha (2006) , this example serves as an existence proof of causal effectiveness of multilevel selection. If correct, this analysis implies that discussion of evolutionary processes leading to innate behaviour and brain modules should take into account the key role played by emotional systems in the development of these behaviours and modules (Ellis and Toronchuk 2005) . Omitting this link, based in specific neuronal mechanisms, can arguably lead to incorrect claims about existence of innate brain modules (Ellis 2008 ).
The analysis above also confirms the idea of top-down causation in the adaptive selection process (Campbell 1974, Martinez and Moya 2012) . Indeed it supports the view that emergence of complexity such as life requires a reverse of flow of information, from bottom-up only to also including a flow from the environment down (Walker, Cisneros and Davies 2012) , where "the environment" includes the group. This reverse flow is needed because adaptive selection causes adaptations of the organism to the environment: but this cannot happen unless information flows down from the environment into the organism, where it alters both structure and behaviour. This is what has happened in the past in the case of the coming into being of the innate primary emotional systems, which can be claimed to have played a key role in evolutionary development. However, in contrast to Campbell's compelling example of the jaw of a worker or termite ant (Campbell 1974 ),
The analysis presented here emphasizes the importance of taking biological mechanisms seriously in studies of evolutionary selection. The proposal made here suggests further useful developments:
• Seeing how this view extends to the level of cells, where the selection pressures that lead to existence of chemical synapses between neurons, rather than much faster electrical synapses, can plausibly be related to the evolutionary need to develop synaptic plasticity that can be affected by the diffusely projected neuromodulators that form Edelman's `value system' (Edelman 1992 ).
• Seeing how this view extends even further to the underlying level of genes, where the key feature of multiple realizability, which underlies all top-down causation (Ellis 2012) , leads to selection based in equivalence classes of sets of genes, rather than selection of individual genes.
In both these cases (selection at the neuronal level and selection at the genetic level) it is clear that the selection mechanisms in operation can only be of the multi-level kind discussed in this paper, as Clearly there will be other contexts where the distinctions proposed in this paper might be useful:
indeed they may be relevant anywhere where multilevel selection might perhaps be in play. 
